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Formal integration archetypes in ambidextrous organizations 
ABSTRACT 
Research suggests that organizational ambidexterity, an organization’s capacity to pursue both 
exploratory and exploitative activities, is critical to firm innovation and performance. Extant 
research primarily emphasizes several firm-level informal integration mechanisms, such as 
creating a common vision and relying on social integration, for integrating structurally 
ambidextrous units. Research has largely ignored, however, the formal mechanisms by which 
organizations have integrated such units.  
In this inductive study, using archival and interview data from organizations in Silicon 
Valley, we address this gap by identifying the formal integration archetypes that enable core 
business units to collaborate with new venture units to incubate new businesses. The four 
integration archetypes that enable collaboration vary along two key dimensions: who initiates 
new ventures and when collaboration is solicited. We identify formal administrative and resource 
mechanisms that enable such collaboration. We combine the disparate literatures of temporal and 
spatial separation of ambidextrous structures, and demonstrate how these must be combined at 
the business unit and new venture levels of analysis to achieve integration. The practical 
contribution of this study lies in identifying suitable contexts in which each of these archetypes 
can be utilized by practitioners for reintegrating new venture projects developed in separate 
structures.  
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1. Introduction 
Most large organizations face the challenge of creating and sustaining new ventures while 
simultaneously managing and growing their existing core businesses. Research suggests that 
ambidextrous structures—those that enable organizations to simultaneously exploit current 
capabilities while exploring new ones—are key to meeting this challenge (O’Reilly and 
Tushman, 2007; Raisch, Birkinshaw, Probst, and Tushman, 2009; Smith and Tushman, 2005; 
Tushman and O’Reilly, 1996). These organizations are likely to increase their growth, return on 
investment and market share (Han and Celly, 2008; He and Wong, 2004; Simsek, Heavey, Veiga, 
and Souder, 2009).  
Despite the increasing interest in and potential benefits of ambidextrous structures, studies 
that explore how organizations can maintain this crucial balance between separation and 
integration of core and new businesses are relatively rare and fragmented (Durisin and Todorova, 
2012; Gassmann, Widenmayer, and Zeschky, 2012; Heller, 1999; Leifer, McDermott, O’Connor, 
Peter, Rice, and Veryzer, 2000). Research exploring mechanisms for integrating ambidextrous 
structures has addressed this issue from a broad firm-level perspective (for a notable exception, 
see Gassmann et al., 2012). Such research explores this issue from the corporate level 
perspective, focusing primarily on facets such as shared vision, senior management team 
coordination, and cross-functional interfaces that enable knowledge sharing (Burgers, Jansen, 
Van Den Bosch, Frans, and Volberda, 2009; O’Reilly and Tushman, 2007; Smith and Tushman, 
2005; Simsek et al., 2009; Tiwana, 2008).  
Existing research does not explain, however, the processes and steps through which new 
venture units and core business units collaborate on new venture projects. In other words, current 
discussions on integration of ambidextrous structures have only outlined a general picture of 
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what elements the integration process entails. They do not tell us the operational nuances of how 
and when business units and new venture units integrate with existing core units to develop new 
businesses. Focusing on the how and when is critical because possessing such integration 
processes are not trivial capabilities. Strategic ambidexterity is a critical capability (Han and 
Celly, 2008; O’Reilly and Tushman, 2007). Organizations that grasp the processes for achieving 
ambidexterity are likely to succeed in developing new businesses (Han and Celly, 2008). Indeed, 
scholars have begun to call for research addressing the integration process more concretely. For 
example, Durisin and Todorova (2012) argue that “the stress on structural and cultural separation 
and managing reintegration should shift from what activities to reintegrate to when and how to 
reintegrate them” (p. 71). In this paper, we respond to this call and explain the processes through 
which organizations can reintegrate new ventures into their core businesses. 
Theoretically, we situate our study as an extension of Gassmann et al.’s (2012) insightful 
work that addresses the how of new venture integration. Gassmann et al. (2012) identify informal 
mechanisms, at the new venture unit and the core business unit level, mostly based on 
willingness of participating entities to work together, through which new ventures integrate 
innovations into core business units. These mechanisms include gaining external validation, 
innovation showcasing, liaison channeling, network building, and collaborative decision making. 
Their study identifies the informal mechanisms needed to integrate new ventures with core 
business units. Missing from their discussion, however, is an understanding of the formal 
administrative mechanisms that propel such integration. How do organizations, for example, 
connect the vested interests and formal responsibilities of these structurally separated 
organizational entities? What is the role of funding or project ownership in determining 
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collaboration? Effective collaboration between business and new venture units might be difficult 
in the absence of formal mechanisms that create linked organizational interests.  
To fill this gap, our research specifically focuses on the formal integration mechanisms 
through which new venture units and core business units of leading global organizations 
collaborate to develop emerging businesses. We identify the actors who initiate the new venture, 
the responsibilities of the actors, the timeline of the integration, and the contextual conditions 
under which a particular type of integration might be appropriate. We explore processes and 
practices by which business units and new venture units work together to create and develop new 
businesses. Thus the research questions explored in our study are: How and when must new 
venture and business units collaborate to incubate new businesses? What are the formal 
integrating mechanisms by which new venture units and business units effectively collaborate to 
develop new businesses?  
We conducted an inductive study using the multiple case research design (Eisenhardt, 1989; 
Yin, 2009). We used archival and interview data from organizations based primarily in Silicon 
Valley’s high-technology industry. Results of our study indicate that new venture units 
collaborate with business units through four formal integration archetypes. These four integration 
archetypes vary along two key dimensions: who initiates new ventures and the point when 
collaboration is solicited. We also explicitly identify the formal administrative and resource 
mechanisms that enable collaboration for these different archetypes. 
The theoretical contribution of this study lies in identifying the formal integration 
mechanisms at the new venture and core business unit level through which new projects are 
integrated into core business units. Additionally, we combine the disparate literatures on 
temporal and spatial separation of ambidextrous structures (Raisch, 2008) to show how both are 
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combined at the new venture and core business unit level for integration. Our study’s practical 
contribution lies in identifying suitable contexts and projects in which each of these archetypes 
can be utilized by practitioners for integrating new venture projects developed in separate 
structures. For each of these archetypes, moreover, we also suggest formal resource and 
administrative means that practitioners can leverage for successful integration. 
2. Literature Review  
The theoretical tension between integration and separation dominates the literature on 
organizational ambidexterity (Jansen, Tempelaar, Van Den Bosch, and Volberda, 2009; O’Reilly 
and Tushman, 2004; Tushman and Smith, 2002). The literature provides several theoretical 
perspectives through which organizations can achieve balanced ambidextrous structures. Despite 
these perspectives, we know very little about how organizations practically deploy solutions to 
reintegrate structures (Gassmann et al., 2012; Raisch, 2008; Siggelkow and Levinthal, 2003). In 
this section, we review the literature on the different routes through which organizations achieve 
ambidexterity and address the processes through which reintegration is achieved. We identify the 
gaps in literature and elaborate upon how our study addresses these gaps.   
2.1. Structural separation to achieve organizational ambidexterity 
 Previous research has suggested that organizations need to be ambidextrous to pursue the often-
contradictory goals of exploitation and exploration (Duncan, 1976; Gibson and Birkinshaw, 2004; 
He and Wong, 2004; Levinthal and March, 1993; O’Reilly and Tushman, 2004; Tushman, 
Anderson, and O’Reilly, 1997). Firms achieve ambidexterity through different routes: temporal 
separation, spatial separation, and parallel structures (Raisch, 2008; Raisch and Birkinshaw, 
2008). Temporal separation refers to a model in which organizations alternate between periods of 
decentralization to emphasize innovations and periods of centralization to enhance cost 
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efficiencies (Raisch, 2008). Thus exploration and exploitation are emphasized sequentially rather 
than simultaneously (Gupta, Smith, and Shalley, 2006; Raisch, 2008). Scholars have also 
suggested that overall decentralization at one temporal phase with subsequent reintegration in the 
next yields the highest organizational performance (Siggelkow and Levinthal, 2003). From a 
process perspective, temporal separation leads to changes in formal structures, routines, and 
systems. Developing process mechanisms and interpersonal relationships that enable this vital 
switch between exploration and exploitation is critical (Wang and Rafiq, 2012). 
In the next route to achieving ambidexterity, organizations create spatial separation, also 
referred to as structural separation (Raisch and Birkinshaw, 2008), at the business unit or 
corporate level. When opting for this route, organizations use separate units for exploration and 
exploitation, where each activity is managed in its unique way (Benner and Tushman, 2003; 
Duncan, 1976; Gibson and Birkenshaw, 2004; McDonough and Leifer, 1983; Raisch and 
Birkinshaw, 2008; Raisch et al., 2009; Tushman and O’Reilly, 1996). In spatial separation, 
organizations partition themselves into separate structures for handling routine and non-routine 
(Adler, Goldoftas, and Levine, 1999; Jansen et al., 2009; Kortmann, 2012). This spatial 
separation creates boundaries through which radically innovative exploratory activities and 
incrementally innovative exploitation activities are physically dispersed from one another 
(Benner and Tushman, 2003). The architecture for exploitation emphasizes highly structured 
roles and responsibilities, centralized procedures, and a focus on efficiency (Nadler and Tushman, 
1996). In contrast, organizational architectures for exploration are based on decentralized 
structures, loose work processes, and a focus on experimentation (Tushman et al., 1997). Spatial 
separation insulates exploratory units from inertia existing in the parent organization and allows 
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the organization to achieve exploration and exploitation simultaneously (Gilbert, 2005; Jansen et 
al., 2009).  
The final route to achieving ambidexterity involves parallel structures. Here organizations 
use primary and secondary structures to carry out key tasks (Raisch and Birkinshaw, 2008). An 
organization’s primary structure is used for incremental innovation and for maintaining stability, 
while secondary structures such as project teams and networks are geared toward exploratory 
activities (Adler et al., 1999; Raisch and Birkinshaw, 2008). The logic of parallel structures is 
that work units perform different kinds of tasks and deal with different task environments and, 
thus, that separation enables each unit to focus on its tasks more effectively (McDonough and 
Leifer, 1983). Thus, while temporal separation is time related, both structural separation and 
parallel structures relate to spatial separation. 
2.2. Integration of ambidextrous structures 
Although scholars have emphasized the creation of separate organizational units to focus on 
exploration and innovation, the next key question is how do units that are separated achieve 
integration? Integration is important because structurally separated units are unable to share 
knowledge and resources with mainstream units (Burgers et al., 2009). New venture units 
possess knowledge and capabilities for identifying and incubating new business opportunities. In 
addition, they face fewer constraints as compared to established business units. On the other 
hand, most new venture units do not control the core resources or possess the necessary 
infrastructure to transform an early-stage venture project into an established viable business. 
These resources and capabilities normally reside with core business units (O’Reilly and Tushman, 
2004). Thus, even though organizations establish separate structures, it is important to have 
organizational processes to tie these different units together. Recent research suggests that 
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effective integration is critical for ensuring sustained growth (Durisin and Todorova, 2012). 
Organizations do not reap the full benefits of new ventures, unless these are successfully 
integrated. 
Yet many organizations face great challenges in integrating innovations developed in new 
venture units with their core business units. For example, O’Connor and Maslyn (2004) describe 
the Business Venture Group (BVG), a new venture unit created by Nortel Networks in the late 
1990s. Nortel’s initial intention was to graduate 80% of their new venture projects internally to 
Nortel’s existing businesses and spin-out the remaining 20% of the projects. But in a surprising 
turn of events, only 20% of the new venture projects were accepted by and folded back into core 
business units. Similarly, Intel’s New Business Initiative (NBI) group (Intel’s corporate new 
venture unit) had 48 venture projects in 2007. Of these, 14 grew and were folded back to the core 
business units. Eleven of the 14, however, were shut down shortly after being folded back. 
Executives at NBI admitted that such survival rates were poor (Shih and Thurston, 2008). 
In contrast, the Emerging Business Opportunity (EBO) program (IBM’s famous corporate 
incubation initiative) proved to be a phenomenal success (O’Reilly, Harreld, and Tushman, 
2009). From 2000 to 2008, IBM’s EBO program launched a total of 25 EBO initiatives. Among 
these, three have failed, and the remaining 22 have produced more than 15% of the revenues for 
the company (O’Reilly et al., 2009). Indeed, four of the seven initiatives launched with the EBO 
in 2000 have graduated successfully and become growth businesses. Thus successfully 
reintegrating ambidextrous structures is a key practical challenge for organizational managers, in 
addition to being a tenacious research issue. 
What are the mechanisms through which these ambidextrous organizations integrate? 
Organizational theory points to two: formal and informal mechanisms. Formal integration 
9 
 
mechanisms include departmentalization; centralization or decentralization; formalization and 
standardization; planning such as strategic planning; and control such as financial performance 
and technical reports (Galbraith, 1973; Lawrence and Lorsch, 1967; March and Simon, 1958; 
Martinez and Jarillo, 1989; Ouchi, 1977). Informal mechanisms include lateral or cross-
departmental relations such as direct managerial contacts, temporary teams, integrating roles, 
integrative departments; informal communication such as personal contacts among managers; 
and socialization techniques such as inculcating organizational culture and values through 
training and reward systems (Galbraith, 1973; Lawrence and Lorsch, 1967; March and Simon, 
1958; Martinez and Jarillo, 1989, Ouchi, 1977). 
Few studies have addressed these mechanisms to explain the integration of separated units 
(Durisin and Todorova, 2012). Studies that analyze this issue underscore primarily informal 
mechanisms at the level of the corporation and top management. Focusing at that level of 
analysis, Burgers et al. (2009) identify cross-functional interfaces, top management team’s 
contingency rewards, shared organizational vision, and top management team’s social 
embeddedness as key to integration. Similarly, O’Reilly and Tushman (2004) suggest senior 
management team integration, common vision and values, and senior-team rewards as central to 
integrating ambidextrous units.  
In contrast to these corporate level perspectives, a notable study by Gassmann et al. (2012) 
focuses on how innovations are integrated at the level of the business unit and the new venture 
unit. Drawing on informal mechanisms identified in theory such as socialization strategies, 
lateral or cross-departmental relations, and informal communications (Galbraith, 1973; Lawrence 
and Lorsch, 1967; Martinez and Jarillo, 1989), Gassmann et al. (2012) identify four key 
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integration strategies: seeking external validation, innovation showcasing, liaison building, 
network channeling, and collaborative decision making (Gassmann et al., 2012).  
New venture units, for example, use legitimation strategies—external validation from 
prominent customers and innovation showcasing within their organization—to gain acceptance 
for their innovation and reintegrate it into the organization. When adopting these strategies, new 
venture units draw on the socialization aspect of informal structures. They understand their 
organization’s culture and norms regarding innovation and, based on this understanding, position 
their new venture in such a way that it gains legitimacy within their organization. As a result of 
this process, organizations accept the innovation and integrate it.  
The other strategies described by Gassmann et al. (2012)—liaison channeling, network 
building, and collaborative decision making—rely heavily on two prominent informal 
mechanisms, lateral or cross-departmental relations and informal communication (Galbraith, 
1973; Lawrence and Lorsch, 1967; Simon, 1976; Martinez and Jarillo, 1989). In liaison 
channeling, radical innovation units position innovation champions as boundary spanners in 
operational businesses. In turn, these champions form linking pins to decision makers within the 
entire company. This helps managers in the operational mainstream units bypass the “not-
invented-here” syndrome and helps new venture units gain adoption for their innovation 
(Gassmann et al., 2012). In network building, senior- and middle-level managers in the 
operational and mainstream business units directly communicate, exchange information, and 
form personal linkages. Both liaison channeling and network building enable the creation of 
social ties, which in turn become conducive for radical innovation to spread through word of 
mouth.  
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Lastly, collaborative decision making entails the use of integrative innovation planning. 
When using integrative innovation planning new venture units involve business units into radical 
innovation research at early ventures stages. This enables new venture units to impart a sense of 
ownership to the business units for these new projects. This early involvement enables business 
units to accept radical innovations with lesser resistance than if they had become involved at 
later stages. Thus Gassmann et al. (2012) have identified informal mechanisms that enable new 
venture units utilize to seamlessly integrate with the core business units. 
3. Methodology 
In contrast to Gassmann et al.’s (2012) focus on informal mechanisms the purpose of this 
research is to discern the formal integration mechanisms by which business units and new 
venture units effectively collaborate to launch new businesses. We used a multiple case research 
design to explore these issues. Case studies are typically used for theoretical questions that deal 
with real management situations (Gibbert, Ruigrock and Wicki, 2008), or explore new 
theoretical arguments to explain process-level phenomena (Gillham, 2000, Yin, 2009).  Due to 
the complexity and process nature of our research question, combined with the sparse knowledge 
on this issue, we chose a multiple case research design (Eisenhardt, 1989; Yin, 2009). We also 
used multiple case studies because these are considered more robust than a single case study 
design (Gillham, 2000, Yin, 2009). Comparisons across cases allow researchers to validate their 
findings, identify common theoretical mechanisms in different contexts, and increase the validity 
of their research findings (Yin, 2009).  
3.1. Sample Selection   
We followed several criteria when selecting our sample and used a theoretical sampling 
approach to choose organizations in which our phenomenon of interest is best observed 
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(Eisenhardt, 1989). First, we mainly focused on organizations operating in San Francisco’s 
Silicon Valley area. Silicon Valley has a vibrant innovation culture and many organizations try 
and experiment with cutting-edge innovations (Saxenian, 1994; Saxenian, 2002). This provides 
ample opportunities to identify innovative organizations to study. We included some 
organizations not headquartered in Silicon Valley, if they had an active innovation program.  
Second, we identified organizations that had active new business development programs 
at the corporate level, in addition to well-established organizational processes to manage 
innovation projects. Such organizations allow us to analyze the organizational process of 
managing corporate innovation rather than the outcome of the innovation programs per se, such 
as new products or technologies. Third, we sought product innovation focused organizations 
rather than service organizations. Service organizations differ from product organizations due to 
specific characteristics such as intangibility, co-production with customers, perishability, and 
other such features (Djellal and Gallouj, 2001; Fitzsimmons and Fitzsimmons, 2000; Nijssen, 
Hillebrand, Vermuelen, and Kemp, 2006), which in turn leads to different organizational 
processes (Nijssen et al., 2006). Taking these variations into consideration, we focused mainly 
on product-related innovation process. We were able to identify these organizations based on 
case studies, articles, and informal interactions with executives from various organizations.  
We approached these organizations through our direct and indirect network relationships. 
Nine organizations provided us research access. The names of these organizations are not 
reported due to our confidentiality agreements with them. In Table 1, we list detailed information 
about the organizations and their new business venture units. These nine organizations come 
from a variety of industries, including IT hardware, software, document management, hearing 
aids, personal electronics, etc.   
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------------------------------------------ 
INSERT TABLE 1 HERE 
------------------------------------------ 
 
3.2. Data collection 
The data for our study come from three different sources. The first is archival data, including 
published case studies about the organization, media articles, and publications such as annual 
reports, websites, and public presentations by company executives. These materials revealed a 
wide range of information about the organizations in our study. These archival data enabled us to 
gain a deep understanding of the new venture activities within these organizations.  
Our second source of data comes from interviews with company executives. We used the 
following criteria to select executives for interviews. First, the executives had to have been 
involved in managing new business development. Their firsthand knowledge of new venture 
business increases the validity of the interview data. Second, we targeted executives at both 
corporate and business unit levels. Since our research touches on the innovation management 
process that relates to both levels, having both perspectives allowed us to avoid potential bias 
and increase the validity of our interview data.  
We interviewed multiple executives in each organization, including senior vice presidents, 
vice presidents, general managers, senior directors, and directors. These individuals were directly 
involved in new business development. We also interviewed some executives multiple times to 
further clarify certain issues that were unclear in the first interview. Each interview typically 
lasted between one to two hours. Following Eisenhardt (1989), we used semi-structured 
interviews to minimize “pre-conceived” notions in data collection. We started with open-ended 
questions that allowed for discussions relating to our question of interest. We recorded and 
transcribed many of the interviews. For the remaining interviews, in which the participants did 
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not want to be recorded, we took extensive notes during the interview and wrote summaries 
immediately after. These recordings and interview summaries allowed the authors and assistants 
to reliably review the interview data to identify key issues, solutions, and patterns pertaining to 
our research objectives.   
The two data sources (i.e., published materials and interviews) are complementary. In 
some cases, the published materials provided background information and an overall context to 
better understand the company’s innovation activities. In other organizations, the published 
materials provided information on specific innovation programs, which helped us to develop 
focused interview questions. The interview questions were focused on understanding these 
organizations’ progress in managing its corporate innovation programs. Table 2 explains how we 
triangulated data from different sources.  
------------------------------------------ 
INSERT TABLE 2 HERE 
------------------------------------------ 
In addition to our analysis of published materials and extensive interviews with these 
nine organizations, we also attended meetings of a professional group on corporate venturing and 
spoke with other relevant actors in the industry to verify our findings. These meetings and the 
follow-up interviews helped our data analysis in two ways. First, the author shared with the 
group members or interview subjects some anecdotes and observations from our preliminary 
analyses of the nine organizations. Members of the professional group would comment on these 
observations and phenomena from their own organization’s perspectives. This type of peer and 
expert debriefing enabled us to deepen our understanding of the phenomena that we observed 
from our interviews. Second, group members discussed the innovation management processes in 
general, as well as the specific issues they encountered and solutions they generated. This 
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information helped us view the integration activities we observed in our sample from a new 
perspective. In short, the group meetings and follow-up interviews assisted us in verifying 
patterns and themes that we observed from the data we had already collected.  
In total, we conducted 37 interviews with 24 executives from the nine organizations. By 
adding additional interviews from the 14 organizations through our contacts at the professional 
group, we conducted a total of 51 detailed interviews with 38 executives for this study.  
3.3. Data analysis  
To identify patterns in our data, we analyzed the specific activities for collaboration and related 
issues each company encountered when managing the cooperation between corporate and 
business units in developing new business. We then summarized the key characteristics of these 
phenomena. We triangulated our data by including different data sources of the same case, that is, 
multiple interviews, group meeting notes, and archival data (Yin, 2009).  
We first used within-case data analysis (Eisenhardt, 1989) to find the formal mechanisms 
through which organizations managed core business units and new venture unit interactions. We 
then engaged in cross-case patterns to identify within-group similarities and intergroup 
differences (Eisenhardt, 1989). The objective was to find new patterns used by organizations to 
manage the processes between business units and new venture units when creating and 
integrating new businesses. To delineate the formal mechanisms behind these processes, we 
focused on specific, measurable, and observable rules and responsibilities rather than on vague 
opinions. For example, we emphasized statements such as “as a policy, [X] business unit is 
responsible for 50% of the total project budget” or “the corporate incubator is responsible for 
initiating, setting up, and funding project teams.” In contrast we de-emphasized statements such 
as “the business unit has high stake in the project” or “the corporate incubator is deeply involved 
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in the initial incubation process.” This process allowed us to identify and validate different 
patterns and arrive at the integration archetypes adopted by various organizations.  
In summary, our review of cases and publications, archival data, and interviews with 
organizations provided multiple sources of data to arrive at our findings (Yin, 2009). At this 
stage, we did not gain any new insights or uncover any new patterns in the data from further 
interviews. This enabled us to conclude that we reached theoretical saturation (Eisenhardt, 1989; 
Glaser and Strauss, 1967) regarding how this process is managed. 
4. Findings  
As a result of analyzing the formal mechanisms by which business units and new venture units 
integrated new projects, we arrived at four integration mechanisms, or archetypes, that we 
describe below. These four integration archetypes are founded on two mechanisms; 
administrative accountability and resources invested in new ventures. Based on the timing and 
relative involvement of the business unit relative new venture units, these archetypes—initiation, 
and early-, mid-, and late-stage involvement—are used in various forms in different 
organizations. We found one structural commonality across most organizations beyond these 
four integration archetypes, namely advisory boards. We first discuss this structural commonality 
before focusing on the four integration archetypes. 
With the exception of three organizations in our study (COTS, COEN, and CONI), the 
majority of the organizations in our sample established committees or boards consisting of 
executives from core business units to supervise or advise new venture activities. These 
committees provide advice to the venture incubator regarding the new projects that need to be 
focused upon. COME, a cloud-based computing business, is a case in point. Several committees, 
one of which consists of heads of core business units, advise its corporate new venture incubator. 
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Although the funding and initial incubation are supported for about six months by the corporate 
incubator, the incubator normally finds a business unit to sponsor or supervise each project that it 
is working on. The sponsoring business unit has a direct say on whether to continue the project.  
In some organizations, such advisory boards are deeply involved in the details of the 
incubation process. Sometimes, such deep involvement causes obstacles to new venture 
development. For example, in 1996, Nortel established a corporate new business development 
organization. This organization was supervised by an advisory board, which consisted of the 
company’s executive vice presidents from various core businesses and administrative branches 
(O’Connor and Maslyn, 2004). The board’s main responsibility was to supervise the 
development of new venture projects and make funding decisions. But such deep involvement 
created challenges to new venture projects.  
First, most of the board members were executives whose experience lay in managing 
large, established organizations. They therefore had a strong bottom-line mentality. They lacked 
the necessary knowledge and skills to properly guide and manage early-stage ventures. They 
were also reluctant to commit significant funds to high potential but risky projects. In addition, 
high turn-over among advisory board members made it difficult for the board to provide new 
ventures with consistent guidance and decisions. Second, when the interests of the advisory 
board members were tied to the interests of established business units, the board members were 
likely to be biased against new ventures, especially if these ventures hurt the interests of the core 
business units. This made it difficult for board members to provide sound guidance to new 
ventures (O’Connor and Maslyn, 2004). 
This finding on a common advisory board involvement is congruent with the findings in 
literature that top management integration is key for linking ambidextrous structures (O’Reilly 
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and Tushman, 2007; Smith and Tushman, 2005; Simsek et al., 2009; Tiwana, 2008). In addition 
to top-level integration through a common advisory board, organizations develop four other 
distinctive integration archetypes to facilitate cooperation between core business units and new 
venture units in order to integrate innovation projects. These ideal types vary along two 
dimensions. The first is administrative ownership and accountability. This typically includes 
business units jointly owning and sharing the responsibilities of developing innovation projects 
with new venture units. Such shared responsibilities make business units motivated to work with 
new venture units to develop new projects.  
The second dimension in facilitating integration relates to the resources that business 
units invest in the new venture projects and the risks and rewards associated with these projects. 
Such investments typically include financial and human resources. On the risk side, when 
business units invest in new venture projects, they face risks because of the uncertainty inherent 
in these projects. This is especially true when business units invest in early-stage venture projects 
in which the directions and outcomes of the projects are highly uncertain. Under such situations, 
business units are motivated to work with corporate venture units to help new venture projects 
minimize the risks of losing the invested resources and capabilities. On the expected return side, 
business units are always motivated to accept and integrate new venture projects if they believe 
the investment in new venture projects will result in good return and rewards to the business 
units. Obviously, for any given venture project, these two factors (minimizing risks and 
maximizing returns) are highly related. Many times, business units invest in projects with high 
risks due to the probability of high returns.  
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In the following sections, we first explain how each archetype works followed by a 
discussion of how each archetype uses administrative responsibility, and the risk versus reward 
tradeoff, to facilitate integration of new venture projects. 
4.1. Integration Archetype 1: Business units initiating projects, new venture units co-incubating 
(early-stage)  
In some organizations, business units have enough resources, power, and scale to lead their own 
new business development activities. However, these business units need help and support from 
the corporate new venture units, for example, to obtain talent and knowledge. They also require 
cross-business coordination for managing the incubation process. Under such circumstances, 
organizations let business units decide what new businesses to incubate and, at the same time, 
take advantage of the unique capabilities of corporate new venture units. In sum, in this 
integration archetype, corporate venture units do not actively initiate new projects. Rather, they 
use their knowledge and capabilities to help business units incubate and develop new projects.  
The incubation process of CONI is a typical example of this integration archetype. The 
company’s new venture unit collaborates with business units through a multi-step process. In the 
first step, the new venture unit works with liaisons from business units to solicit and identify new 
projects. New venture units then help business units to develop business and technology plans 
for these new businesses and conduct initial tests. Although most of the work at this phase is 
done at the site of the corporate new venture unit, business units provide suggestions and are 
involved in the process. The next step is the validation phase where CONI’s new venture unit 
and business units work together on the proof of technology and business concepts, and test key 
elements of the business and technology plans for different projects.  
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As a part of this process, CONI’s new venture unit works with different stakeholders at 
business units to ensure support for the new projects. For example, the new venture unit 
identifies champions at business units for each of the new businesses. The new venture unit also 
works closely with senior executives and business development planners of these business units 
to gain support. For example, the senior manager of corporate venture group indicated that: 
At the validation phase, we [the new venture unit] require business units to agree on 
certain conditions in order to get our further funding at this phase. One of the conditions 
is that if we provide to a business unit certain data and info to validate the potential of a 
co-incubated project, the business unit will need to give us a clear decision whether or not 
it will include the project into its formal new business development plan.  
Furthermore, the new venture unit requires business units to gradually increase their 
funding for the projects. For example, when a project is at the first phase, business units are 
expected to contribute about 25% of the total funding, while in the next phase they contribute 
about 50% of the total funding. Such escalation of commitment from business units ensures their 
buy-in and commitment. Besides CONI, several other organizations also adopted this integration 
archetype, including COAS, COME, and COPH. Some organizations consider helping business 
units co-incubate new projects to be one of the key performance indicators of their new venture 
units.  
As we can see, the integration mechanism works along two dimensions in this archetype. 
On the administrative ownership and accountability dimension, the corporate new venture unit 
and business unit share administrative ownership and responsibility of the new venture projects. 
Although in early stages, the corporate new venture group takes leading roles in performing the 
daily tasks related to incubation, the fact that the new innovation projects are initiated and 
sponsored by business units make the latter share significant responsibility and ownership of the 
projects. On the resources risk and reward dimension, the corporate new venture unit contributes 
more resources initially. But such resource contribution by the corporate new venture unit is 
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contingent upon business units increasing their resource contributions when the projects meet 
certain milestones. This rule applies even when projects are in early stages and still risky, thus 
making business units share more of the risk if the projects fail. Such a risk of losing sunk 
resources invested in the projects motivates business units to accept and continue supporting new 
ventures. 
A key advantage of this integration archetype is that business units can leverage the new 
business development competencies of corporate new venture units. Such benefits are especially 
important for core business units that have limited capability of developing new business. The 
disadvantage of this integration archetype is that it favors short-term new venture projects and 
misses promising innovation opportunities. This is because business units typically tend to 
ignore opportunities that are not directly related to their immediate business domain, despite 
possibilities of high returns.  
4.2. Integration Archetype 2: New venture units initiating new projects, involving business units 
early on (early-stage) 
In some organizations, business units lack the capabilities to take an active role in initiating new 
business projects and need assistance in developing new businesses. In others, corporate 
headquarters might explore new business directions that may not immediately benefit existing 
business units. Even if that new direction can leverage the resources and capabilities of certain 
business units, the units may not be motivated to explore the opportunity due to financial or other 
reasons. In both situations, corporate new venture units must to take the lead and spearhead new 
businesses for the core business units. The challenge for new venture units is to gain the buy-in 
from business units as early as possible. The second integration archetype addresses this purpose. 
In this integration archetype, corporate new venture units take the lead in identifying and 
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initiating emerging business projects, but they find business units to either fund or to co-incubate 
the projects from early on. The key difference between this and the previous archetype is that 
corporate new venture units, rather than business units, initiate projects.   
COEN adopted this integration archetype. This Japanese company set up a corporate new 
venture unit in Silicon Valley for developing and commercializing new technologies. Once the 
new venture unit selects projects, they approach business units in Japan to fund and sponsor the 
projects. The unit in Silicon Valley is responsible for hiring experienced entrepreneurs to test, 
explore, and incubate new projects. During the incubation process, sponsoring business units will 
periodically meet with new venture teams in Silicon Valley to check milestones and decide the 
project’s future development.  
COBI follows a similar, yet slightly different practice. COBI’s corporate venture unit 
initiates emerging business projects. Once a project is identified, the new venture unit asks a 
business unit to fund the incubation and to co-host the project. Furthermore, each project requires 
an active sponsorship from a senior vice president in the hosting business unit. In the early 
incubation phases, new venture units take a leading role in working with co-hosting business 
units to develop new ventures. The company’s corporate venture and the hosting business units 
jointly hold monthly meetings to monitor and develop new projects. When the project matures, 
the new venture unit hands the new businesses over to core business units for further 
development.  
Several other organizations such as COEX and COME have adopted a similar integration 
archetype. It is important to note that in this integration archetype, resources provide the key 
integration mechanism, i.e., new venture units get business units to invest in the innovation 
projects early on. Because business units bear significant risks in funding these projects from 
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inception, they are motivated to support and accept the venture projects to mitigate the risks of 
losing sunk investments in new projects. In the early stages of the innovation projects, although 
the business units are involved administratively, corporate new venture groups tend to take more 
responsibility in developing the projects on a daily basis. But business units still have the power 
to influence the direction of and even terminate projects. Compared to the previous archetype, 
this one relies more heavily on resource contributions from business units to facilitate their 
commitment to and involvement in innovation projects. 
This integration archetype is valuable to new venture projects that need to leverage 
resources from existing businesses. Under this integration archetype, new venture units must set 
emerging business agendas that are relevant to business units and be able to persuade business 
units to take on new venture projects from very early on.  
4.3. Integration Archetype 3: Gradually involving business units into the incubation process 
(mid-stage) 
 Some new businesses are highly uncertain in their early phases of development and do not 
clearly fit into the core business unit’s focus. Some will require a long time to incubate. Business 
units are typically reluctant to fund such projects or co-incubate them from the outset. Under 
these circumstances, new venture units need to initiate, fund, and incubate new ventures and 
gradually involve business units into the incubation activities as the projects become more 
promising in terms of financial viability.  
COAS’s integration archetype is a case in point. Its new venture unit normally initiates 
the projects and then invites business units to evaluate and approve the new projects that it 
intends to incubate. Once approved, the new venture unit uses its own budget to hire a group of 
people (normally about six) to incubate for around six months. At the end of these six months, 
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the project team reports to the business units for another round of approval. At this second stage, 
the new venture unit typically requires business units to increase their commitment if the project 
meets certain milestones. More specifically, the new venture team presents a set of business 
targets and milestones to be met at different time points in the following 12 months. They then 
check if the business unit will be willing to take over the project if the team achieves its 
performance targets and milestones at the end of the 12 months. Although business units’ 
willingness to take over the project at this point is not a formal commitment, it clearly sends a 
strong message to new venture units and gives business units enough time to seriously plan 
taking over the new venture project if it meets its targets.  
COPH’s corporate new venture unit, as well as its R&D lab, follows a similar multi-step 
process to ensure the gradual buy-in from business units. At COPH’s corporate R&D lab, the 
first phase of new venture development is managed by its “Innovation Research Program.” Here, 
early research and new technical concepts are developed. If a project survives this phase, the 
project enters demonstration or proof of concept phase and is moved to the Technology Transfer 
Office for further development. At this second phase, the Technology Transfer Office works 
with customers to experiment and prove technology concepts. This is the third incubation phase, 
in which new venture units involve business groups to jointly work on new projects. In this third 
phase, business groups typically contribute people and partial funding to work with researchers 
at COPH’s new venture unit. If a project survives this incubation phase, the new venture unit 
hands over the project to a business group for commercialization. At the commercialization stage, 
business groups assume full responsibility to launch the new business on a global scale.  
COPH’s new venture unit sets clear criteria for a project to move from one phase to the 
next. For example, for a project to move from proof of concept (second) phase to incubation 
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(third) phase, in which business units start getting involved, the project needs to demonstrate 
three milestones: one, that the technology is ready for the market; two, that early customers are 
ready to adopt the technology; and three, that the business groups are ready to work with 
corporate R&D to further incubate the technology. For a project to be fully handed over to a 
business group, the new project needs to be at or close to a financial break-even point. Business 
units need to believe that the new business will bring in sufficient financial contributions to 
justify   investments in deploying these new products on a global basis. While deciding whether 
to take over a new venture project, business groups at COPH do their own due diligence to 
evaluate the market potential, growth prospects, and investment returns of the project.  
In this archetype, companies simultaneously rely on the administrative and resource 
mechanisms, particularly the risk versus reward dimensions, to incrementally make business 
units integrate new venture projects into their operations. From the resources perspective, 
corporate new venture groups make business units increase their investments and resource 
commitment to a project as the project grows. Such an increasing commitment in resources is 
accompanied by increased integration on the administrative ownership and responsibility side. 
Business units have a stronger influence over new projects and more involvement in developing 
them and eventually taking over these projects entirely. This gradual increase of commitment 
gives business units the opportunity and time to become familiar with and assess the value and 
risks of the projects. This integration archetype works well for new venture projects that require 
long incubation cycles, face high level of uncertainty, or do not have a clear fit with existing 
business units at the initial incubation phase.  
4.4. Integration Archetype 4: Transitional home (late-stage) 
26 
 
In many organizations, new venture units have limited resources. In order to continuously 
explore new opportunities, they need to graduate new venture businesses that are mature but still 
too young to be fully integrated into core business units. This creates a dilemma of where to 
house these adolescent emerging businesses. Some organizations address this problem by 
creating transitional business units (or emerging business units) to house new venture projects 
that have grown to an adolescent stage. Such emerging business units are both independent from 
early-phase incubation groups and also separate from core business units. 
The high-end game computer project at COPH is a case in point. When COPH’s 
incubator completed its early-stage incubation, it did not graduate or move this new business to 
the established notebook division. Instead, the company created a transitional business unit 
called Emerging Business Unit (EBU), which hosted the computer game business and two other 
emerging businesses.  
Similarly, COIC’s new business development system follows this transitional home 
integration archetype. Its new venture unit, Emerging Technology Group, is responsible for 
incubating early-stage new venture projects. When the project reaches certain milestones, such as 
sales targets, the new project is transferred to the Advanced Technology Group rather than to the 
company’s Core Technology Group, where its established core businesses are managed. The 
Advanced Technology Group mainly deals with high-growth venture projects that have passed 
the initial emerging phase. At the Advanced Technology Group, the typical business 
development cycle is 12 to 18 months, significantly shorter than that of the Emerging 
Technology Group, an early-stage incubator (three to five years), but longer than that of Core 
Technology Group which operates on quarterly basis. At the Advanced Technology Group, the 
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focus is on helping transfer venture projects from emerging to established businesses and on 
providing a transitional home for new venture projects that have reached the adolescent phase.  
Integration Archetype 4 provides adolescent emerging business additional time to 
develop until they are financially attractive to business units and are mature enough to withstand 
the discipline and procedures of established business. In this archetype, the integration 
mechanism does not depend on business units’ administrative responsibilities in co-developing 
the new venture projects. Furthermore, business units do not invest in projects in the early or 
even mid stages of development. Rather, business units are motivated to integrate and invest 
resources into these new venture projects because of the greater certainty of expected returns.  
In sum, the integration mechanism of Archetype 4 comes mainly from financial and 
resource channels; none or very little integration comes from shared administrative responsibility 
or ownership. This archetype has its weaknesses, however. Emerging business projects that grow 
and become too “mature” in the environment outside of a business unit can cause cultural clashes, 
resource duplications, and other issues when the projects are folded back to business units.  
4.5. Integrating new venture and business units 
These four archetypes utilize different mechanisms to facilitate business units’ integration 
with new venture projects based on who initiates an innovation and when business units become 
involved (see Figure 1). At one extreme of the timeline, Archetypes 1 and 2 require business 
units early on to share administrative responsibilities to co-incubate new venture projects. On the 
other, Archetype 4’s mechanism focuses on providing business units the incentives to integrate 
should they decide to invest resources in the new venture projects later on in their development. 
In Archetype 3, business units both invest resources and share development responsibilities when 
new ventures are still relatively young and face certain risks. The business unit’s decision to 
28 
 
gradually increase its share of administrative responsibilities and resource investments in the 
projects, however, is affected by the decline of risks and expected returns of the venture projects 
as in Archetype 4.  
------------------------------------------ 
INSERT FIGURE 1 HERE 
------------------------------------------- 
Although Archetypes 1 and 2 are at one end of the timeline spectrum, they differ in terms 
of who initiates the new project and the related resource invested. First, in Archetype 1, new 
venture projects are started by business units, whereas in Archetype 2, corporate new venture 
units initiate new projects. In turn, business units share more extensive ownership of new venture 
projects in Archetype 1 than in Archetype 2. Second, there are key differences between these two 
archetypes in the resource dimension. Archetype 2 requires business units to be the primary 
investor in a venture project from inception. This investment is a strong mechanism to motivate 
business units to support venture projects. In Archetype 1, however, business units are not the 
primary investor to the projects at the beginning. In general, both archetypes necessitate 
investment of financial or administrative resources into the project early on by the business units.  
In contrast, the integration mechanism in Archetype 4 is mainly incentivizing business 
units to integrate even though the business units have not shared administrative responsibility 
and/or invested resources in the projects. Archetype 3’s integration mechanisms entail the 
elements of Archetypes 1 and 2 on the one hand, and that of Archetype 4 on the other.  
We summarize these four archetypes in Table 3. In Table 3, we explain the key 
characteristics, the distinctive integration archetype used by the business units and new venture 
units to integrate the new venture projects, the contexts and environments in which each 
archetype is suitable, and the types of new venture projects that might benefit from a given 
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archetype. In Table 3, we also indicate that for a given new venture project, companies can only 
choose only one of the four archetypes to fold back the new venture projects into business units; 
given the temporal dimension of the process, they archetypes are mutually exclusive. For 
example, if a company uses Integration Archetype 2 (New venture units initiating new projects, 
involving business units early on) to create a business unit to co-fund and co-incubate a new 
venture initiated from corporate new venture unit, the company can no longer use other 
archetypes to integrate the same new venture. In this sense, these four archetypes substitute each 
other for a same new venture project. In addition, these four archetypes can also be categorized 
along two dimensions, based on the organizational units that initiate new ventures and the point 
in time at which collaboration is solicited.  
------------------------------------------ 
INSERT TABLE 3 HERE 
------------------------------------------
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5. Discussion 
In this paper we contribute to the organizational ambidexterity literature by presenting formal 
integration mechanisms that enable collaboration between corporate new venture units and core 
business units to develop emerging businesses. In many organizations, new venture units are 
interested in exploring innovations that are not typically addressed by existing business units. At 
the same time, they need the resources, capabilities, and support that business units possess. The 
integration archetypes identified in our research provide some insights into the practices by 
which business units and new venture units might achieve integration under ambidextrous 
structures.  
5.1. Theoretical and practical contributions 
Despite the plethora of high-level recommendations on informal mechanisms through which 
organizational ambidexterity can be achieved (Burgers et al., 2009; O’Reilly and Tushman, 
2004), there is little information about the formal mechanisms through which managers of 
business units and new venture units achieve ambidexterity. Previous research on ambidexterity 
treats it as a strategic variable, as a quality that firms possess or do not possess (Carter, Klegg, 
and Kornberger, 2008). In contrast, we empirically identify the formal integration archetypes 
through which new venture units and business units in all firms can achieve ambidexterity.   
Our work complements Gassmann et al.’s (2012) study on the integration mechanisms in 
ambidextrous structures at the business unit level. Gassmann et al. (2012) identified informal 
mechanisms, such as socialization, informal communication, and cross-departmental relations, 
through which such integration occurs. In this study we offer new insights into formal integration 
mechanisms. In particular, based on who initiates new venture projects and the timing of 
integration, we identified four formal integration archetypes. These four integration archetypes 
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rest on two integration mechanisms: administrative accountability and resources invested in new 
ventures.  
These two integration mechanisms and four archetypes rest on the theoretical formal 
structure concepts of formalization, output control, and strategic planning. To elaborate, the 
types and timing of resources and administrative accountability associated with business units 
and new venture units are clearly documented and standardized, i.e., formalized across the 
organization. Both new venture units and business units are held clearly accountable for their 
output through project milestones and other performance indicators. Thus, output control is the 
second key formal integration mechanism. The strategic planning aspect of formal structure 
encompasses business units and new venture units, determining what kinds of new ventures to 
incubate and the appropriate timing at which projects are transferred. Our study, then, highlights 
how formal structures operate at the level of the business unit and new ventures. 
Another important theoretical contribution of this study is the integration of temporal and 
spatial aspects of ambidexterity. While prior theory has treated these as two different routes to 
achieving ambidexterity (see, e.g., Raisch and Birkinshaw, 2008; Raisch et al., 2009; Tushman 
and O'Reilly, 1996), we highlight how time of integration is a key dimension through which 
innovative projects succeed in gaining traction with core business units. To be specific, we show 
how the temporal dimension of when to integrate determines the spatial processes by which new 
ventures get integrated into organizations. For example, in Integration Archetype 4, the decision 
of new venture units to independently develop projects in early stages (a temporal dimension) 
without determining a home for these projects at the outset necessitates the creation of 
transitional business units (a spatial separation). In contrast, in Integration Archetypes 1 and 2, 
32 
 
early integration (a temporal dimension) enables spatial integration of new ventures into the 
business units with ease. 
Our work is relevant to managers of organizations who are grappling with the question of 
how to effectively integrate innovations developed outside the core business units into the 
organization’s core businesses. In many organizations corporate executives set up new venture 
groups at the corporate level to promote, initiate, and even incubate new venture projects. One of 
the key challenges these organizations face is how to leverage organizations’ existing resources 
and assets to help scale up the new ventures. In most organizations, such key resources and 
assets reside at business units. Thus corporate new venture groups need to fold new venture 
projects back into the core business units for scaling up or commercialization. This requires buy-
in and support from the business units. But many organizations fail to successfully transfer their 
new ventures to business units due to the lack of support and commitment from the business 
units. Our findings illustrate several integration mechanisms to foster cooperation and mutual 
support between business units and corporate new venture groups. We provide the integration 
archetypes, the organizational contexts, and types of new venture that are appropriate for a given 
integration archetype. We hope that managers of organizations can use Table 3 as a ready 
reckoner to identify different archetypes that would work effectively in their context. 
Furthermore, we suggest below some additional ways to effectively apply the integration 
mechanisms discussed in this study.  
First, managers need to be cognizant of the organizational contexts required to apply 
different integration mechanisms. For example, Integration Archetype 1 (business units initiating 
new projects, new venture units co-incubating the projects) is more appropriate for organizations 
in which business units enjoy a high level of autonomy but at the same time need assistance in 
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incubating new ventures. Similarly, organizations with small budgets and small teams doing new 
venture activities at the corporate level may find it difficult to apply Integration Archetype 3 
(new venture units initiating new projects, then gradually involving business units into the 
incubation process) and Integration Archetype 4 (new venture units initiating new projects and 
later housing projects into transitional organization units), as both mechanisms require large 
corporate investment and effort.  
Second, managers also need to consider the nature of new ventures when applying 
different integration mechanisms. For some innovation projects, it is difficult for new venture 
units to involve business units early on as in Integration Archetype 2 (new venture units 
initiating new projects, involving business units from early on). For example, if exploratory 
innovations differ from the business units’ strategic visions, or are highly uncertain in nature, 
business units might not be willing to collaborate with new venture units early on. At the same 
time, new venture units might also be apprehensive about approaching business units to incubate. 
In such situations, Integration Archetype 3, in which corporate new venture units approach 
business units and involve them gradually after the new ventures bring in attractive returns, 
might be the preferred approach. 
Third, although companies cannot use multiple integration archetypes for the same new 
venture project, they can simultaneously use multiple integration archetypes for different new 
venture projects, as each integration archetype helps to integrate new venture activities of 
corporate and business unit levels from different aspects. For example, board committees in 
Integration Archetype 2 (new venture units initiating new projects, involving business units from 
early on) mainly help the corporation new venture units and business units to cooperate on early-
phase new venture projects. In contrast, Integration Archetype 4 (new venture units initiating 
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new projects and later housing the projects into transitional organization units) mainly facilitates 
the integration between corporate new venture group and business units of mid- to late-stage new 
venture projects. Together, these different integration mechanisms can help corporate new 
venture group and business units to support each other in incubating new venture projects.  
5.2. Limitations 
Despite the contributions of our paper, which highlights the formal mechanisms for achieving 
ambidexterity in practice, there are certain limitations. First, our data is restricted to a small 
group of organizations in Silicon Valley that were focusing on product innovations. This might 
reduce the generalizability of our findings to other settings. However, we have tried to include 
organizations from a variety of industries in our sample to make our findings generalizable to a 
broad group of organizations. Although we were able to find several processes and their subtle 
variations, it is not clear if these findings can be applied in service innovation settings or to other 
organizations proposing new ventures. Future studies should examine whether these integration 
archetypes are applicable in other contexts.  
Furthermore, we were able to identify four integration archetypes in this study, but have 
not specified how the characteristics of projects and organizational life cycles might impact their 
use. For example, service organizations might use different integration archetypes as compared 
to product organizations. Similarly, younger firms might have business units that are more likely 
to be entrepreneurial in nature and therefore use Integration Archetype 1 when they initiate 
projects and involve new ventures. In contrast, older firms might be more prone to Integration 
Archetypes 3 and 4 and integrate new ventures only after the merits of the new project have been 
proven. Future research should identify these various dynamics and discern when organizations 
move from one integration archetype to the other.  
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In addition, although we discussed the strengths, weaknesses, and conditions under which 
different integration archetypes might be effective, future research might address other 
antecedent conditions under which these archetypes might be applicable. In this exploratory 
study, our focus was on determining the strategic practices through which organizations can 
achieve ambidexterity. Regardless, our integration archetypes will enable organizational 
managers to focus on achieving ambidexterity through strategic processes as they incubate new 
projects. 
6. Conclusions 
Organizational ambidexterity is widely used by organizations to achieve their conflicting goals 
of exploration and exploitation. With this research we seek to investigate the formal mechanisms 
that enable the integration of structurally separated units. We identify four integration archetypes 
based on the actors who initiate the collaboration and the point in time at which collaboration is 
solicited. In addition, our formal integration mechanisms identify the administrative and resource 
mechanisms at different points in time at which funding is provided and the deliverables for each 
stage are decided. We also highlight the contexts in which each of these integration archetypes 
are appropriate. It is our hope that researchers and managers of organizations will be able to use 
these archetypes as they grapple with the challenging question of how to integrate their complex 
ambidextrous structures. 
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Table 1. Description of organizations in the study 
Organization Main Business New venture units analyzed  Main responsibilities of the new ventures and their 
relationships with business units 
COBI 
 
Manufactures computer software and 
hardware, and offers related 
infrastructure, hosting, and consulting 
services.  
Corporate emerging business 
incubator.  
Responsible for developing new businesses for the entire 
corporation. Also responsible for coordinating new business 
development activities of various business groups. 
COPH 
 
A multinational corporation offering 
computer hardware, software, IT 
consulting, and services.  
Corporate R&D lab and related 
new ventures.  
Responsible for developing future technologies and incubating 
them into viable businesses.  
 
COIC 
 
Designs, manufactures, and sells network 
equipment and devices.  
Corporate emerging technology 
group.  
Responsible for soliciting innovation ideas, identifying and 
incubating new business opportunities into a viable emerging 
business with several hundred millions of dollars of revenues.  
COEN  Provides information technology (IT) and 
network solutions to business enterprises, 
communications service providers, and 
government agencies.  
North American-based 
corporate new business 
development center for a large 
Japanese company.   
Responsible for scouting new technologies, business 
opportunities, and partners in North America, and incubating 
these opportunities into new business.  
COME Through cloud computing, this company 
enables businesses and service providers 
to transform their operations and deliver 
information technology as a service. It 
helps organizations store, manage, 
protect, and analyze information in a 
more agile, trusted, and cost-efficient 
way. 
 
The Advanced Technology 
Venture group (a new venture 
group) within the corporate 
Chief Technology Officer’s 
office.  
Responsible for identifying and incubating emerging businesses 
from three types of opportunities: (a) disruptive, (b) greenfield 
opportunities that are not core to existing business units, and (c) 
the opportunities that require cross leveraging among multiple 
business units.  
CONI CONI is a leading semiconductor 
corporation. It makes motherboard 
chipsets, network interface controllers 
and integrated circuits, flash memory, 
graphic chips, processors, and other 
devices related to communications and 
computing. 
New Business Group, a 
corporate new venture unit 
Responsible for helping the company to identify and incubate 
new business.   
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Table 1. Description of organizations in the study (cont.) 
Company Main Business Main incubation centers 
analyzed  
Main responsibilities of the incubators and their 
relationships with business units 
COEX COEX is a multinational document 
management corporation. It produces a range 
of printers, photo copiers, digital production 
printing presses, and related consulting 
services and supplies.  
The corporate lab and related 
new venture unit.  
This center is responsible for exploring and developing new 
technologies and transforming these technologies into new 
businesses for the entire corporation.  
COAS 
 
COAS is a multinational software corporation 
that makes enterprise software for managing 
business operations and customer relations. Its 
products include ERP system, enterprise data 
warehouse solutions, and mobile products. 
A global business incubator 
for the entire corporation.  
Help the corporation identify and incubate new business 
opportunities and to assist business units improve their new 
business development process.  
COTS 
 
COTS is a leading hearing aids company, 
which offers, among other products, digital 
hearing aids, noise management and speech 
preservation system, wireless hearing aids, 
and hearing aids for mobile devices.  
Corporate research center.  Responsible for exploring long-term new technologies and 
business opportunities for the corporation. 
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Table 2. Different data sources used in research   
Company Archival Data Interview Data Interviewee and Interview Frequency 
COBI 
 
We collected information from the company 
website, media reports, and published 
research. These data provided the 
background information of the history and 
evolution of COBI’s innovation activities 
and challenges. We also collected 
information of a specific corporate 
innovation program that was managed by the 
corporate incubator.  
We relied on interviews to verify and update public 
information. The public data also allowed us to 
quickly focus on the key research questions 
pertaining to the integration and cooperation 
between business units and new venture groups.  
• Director, Software Strategy, 
Corporate Venture group (2) 
• Partner, Global Research director 
(1) 
• Program Director, Technology & 
Solutions, Software Group (2) 
COPH 
 
We collected archival data from the company 
website and media reports. These data 
explain COPH’s overall corporate innovation 
activities. We also found a case explaining 
COPH’s innovation in developing new 
businesses.  
The archival data provide a good context for us to 
develop interview questions and to better 
understand interview data. The case also provided 
us an in-depth understanding to help us further 
appreciate COPH’s organizational practices in 
managing innovation.  
• Director, Corporate Lab, Strategy 
and Innovation Office (2)  
• General Manager, Business 
Development (2) 
• Director, New Business Venture, 
Strategy and Corporate 
Development (1) 
COIC 
 
We first collected COIC’s information from 
published reports. In addition, the author also 
attended several public presentations made 
by COIC executives. These public data 
provided detailed background information to 
help us decide the right questions to ask in 
interviews.  
The archival data already provided in-depth 
background information, which allowed us to focus 
on organizational practices that COIC followed to 
manage the integration and cooperation between 
corporate new venture group and core business 
units.  
• Senior Director, Innovation 
Emerging Technology Group (2) 
• Director, Business Development 
(2) 
• Senior Manager, GBSG Service 
Organizations (2) 
COEN  We collected background information of this 
company from website, media, and annual 
reports; we did not get information on its 
innovation activities from these sources.  
In our interviews, we first collected information 
about the company’s overall innovation programs, 
then moved on to discuss specific innovation 
projects and the organizational practices that COEN 
followed to manage the innovation projects.  
• General Manager, Corporate 
Business Development (2) 
• Director, Strategy & New 
Business Development, IT 
Platform & Solutions Group (2) 
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Table 2: Different data sources used in research (cont.) 
Company Archival Data Interview Data Interviewee and Interview Frequency 
COME We were able to collect some basic 
information of COME’s innovation 
activities from media reports. The author 
also attended presentations made by 
innovation executives of the company. 
Our first interviews focused on understanding 
COME’s overall set up regarding its corporate 
innovation programs. We then discussed the 
specific innovation projects and the 
organizational arrangements in managing 
integration and cooperation between corporate 
new venture group and business units.  
• Senior Director, Advanced Technology 
Ventures, Office of CTO (2) 
• Director, Technology Alliance (1) 
• Director, Advanced Technology 
Ventures, Office of CTO (1) 
CONI Our archival data mainly come from media 
reports and published cases and public 
presentation s by the company executives. 
These discuss general information  
regarding CONI’s innovation activities and 
the challenges the company faces.  
We first relied on interviews to help us verify 
the background information that we collected 
from archival data. Our interviews mainly focus 
on the organizational structure and processes at 
CONI to manage its corporate innovation 
projects and initiatives.  
• Director of Strategic Investments (1) 
• Director, New Business Initiative (2) 
• Manager of Process/System Engineering, 
Digital Enterprise Group (1) 
COEX We collected archival data from published 
reports that describes the history and 
evolution of COEX’s innovation activities. 
These data provided contextual background 
for us to further study COEX’s specific 
organizational practices in managing 
innovation programs. 
Our interviews focused on specific 
organizational issues, including communication, 
inter-department interactions, and management 
processes that COEX dealt with when managing 
its innovation projects.  
• Senior Manager, Corporate Research 
Lab (1) 
• Manager, Corporate research lab (1) 
 
COAS 
 
The archival data mainly comes from the 
company’s website and published reports. 
These data mainly covered general 
company background information. Our 
main source of data comes from interviews.  
Our first interviews focused on understanding 
COAS’ overall innovation arrangements. We 
then focused on certain aspects of innovation 
management structure and practices that COAS 
followed to manage the integration and 
cooperation between its corporate new venture 
groups and business units.   
• Senior Vice President, Head of Global 
Business Incubator (1) 
• Vice President, Ideation, Global 
Business Incubator (1)  
• Director, Co-Innovation Group (1)  
COTS 
 
We collected basic company background 
information from the company’s website 
and media reports. The main data source is 
from interviews.  
Through several interviews, we collected rich 
information on COTS’ organization structure 
and processes to manage its corporate 
innovation projects.  
• Vice President of Corporate Research (3) 
• Manager, New Venture Unit (1) 
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Table 3: Summary and comparison of the four integration archetypes   
Integration 
Archetype   
Key characteristics Distinctive formal mechanisms to integrate 
new venture projects into BUs (business units) 
Suitable organizational 
contexts/environments 
Suitable new venture 
projects 
Integration 
Archetype 1—
BUs  initiating 
new projects,  
new venture units 
co-incubating the 
projects  
New venture units help BUs 
to co-incubate new projects 
initiated by the BUs, 
especially in early phases. 
The new venture units’ help 
could include knowledge, 
people and funding.  
This archetype relies on administrative 
integration mechanism. First, new venture 
projects are initiated by BUs, which also actively 
participate in the co-development of the projects, 
making BUs accountable for the projects. On the 
resources integration mechanism, although 
corporate new venture units invest more 
resources than BUs to co-develop the projects, 
BUs still need to contribute some resources to the 
projects. Furthermore, investments from new 
venture units are contingent upon BUs’ 
agreement to increase their investments and 
ownership to the projects should the projects 
meet certain development milestones. 
 
Suitable for organizations in 
which BUs enjoy high 
power and autonomy but 
need support in incubating 
new ventures.  
Venture projects that are 
adjacent to BUs’ existing 
business or exploitation 
type of new ventures. 
Mainly applies to early-
stage new ventures.    
Integration 
Archetype 2—
New venture units 
initiating new 
projects, 
involving BUs 
early on.  
  
BUs  are involved in new 
projects initiated by new 
venture units from very early 
on. Such early involvement 
could include BUs taking 
over the venture projects 
when the projects are still 
very young, or BUs co-fund 
and co-incubate a venture 
project from its inception. 
In this archetype, the integration mechanism 
mainly comes from the resource dimension. BUs 
are the primary investor to the venture projects 
from inception. Such investments motivate BUs 
to participate and support  new venture projects 
thus to protecting the resources they have 
invested. On the administrative dimension, BUs 
participate in the early-stage development of the 
projects, but corporate new venture units are 
more active and take more responsibility in 
incubating the projects.  
Suitable for organizations 
whose new venture units 
actively lead new venture 
development at the same 
time want BUs to support 
and take over these new 
ventures. 
Suitable for new 
ventures that BUs are not 
motivated to initiate 
(thus new venture units 
initiate the projects), but 
for projects that need 
BUs’ early support to 
grow and scale up.  
Mainly used  in early 
phase of venture 
projects.  
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Table 3: Summary and comparison of the four integration archetypes (cont.)  
Integration 
Archetype   
Key characteristics Distinctive formal mechanisms to integrate 
new venture projects into BU( business units) 
Suitable organizational 
contexts/environments 
Suitable New venture 
projects 
Integration 
Archetype 3— 
New venture units 
initiating new 
projects, then 
gradually 
involving BUs 
into the 
incubation 
process   
 
New venture units first 
initiate and incubate venture 
projects, then gradually 
involve BUs to co-fund and 
co-incubate the projects. 
Later, BUs fully take over the 
projects. 
This archetype relies on both administrative 
ownership and resource mechanisms to help 
integrate new venture projects. As BUs gradually 
increase their involvement in co-developing 
venture projects with corporate new venture unit, 
they become more committed to accept and 
integrate new venture projects. At the same time, 
BUs’ decision to increase resource investment to 
the projects is motivated by their expected returns 
and rewards from the projects. On the other hand, 
in this archetype, BUs start to invest resources to 
venture projects when the projects still face 
uncertainty and are still risky. Once BUs  invest 
in the projects, they are motivated by another 
factor to help and support the venture projects, 
i.e., to reduce the risks of losing the resources 
they have already invested . 
Suitable for BUs that enjoy 
high autonomy and have 
limited resources to 
incubate new ventures. Also 
suitable for organizations 
whose new venture units 
have the budget and 
capabilities to independently 
incubate new ventures for 
some time without the 
support of  BUs. Mainly 
applies to mid stage 
corporate new ventures.  
Suitable for new 
ventures that require 
long incubation cycles 
and large amount of 
resources to incubate.  
 
Integration 
Archetype 4 —
New venture units 
initiating new 
projects and later 
moving the 
projects into 
transitional 
organizational 
units.  
Creating transitional 
organizational units to host 
new ventures that are too 
“mature” for new venture 
units but are still too young 
or vulnerable to be directly 
folded back into established 
BUs.  
In this archetype, the primary integration 
mechanism rests on financial resources 
dimension. More specifically, it is to provide 
business units with incentives by making new 
venture projects financially more attractive and 
less risky, thus motivating business units to 
accept and integrate new venture projects into 
their internal systems. In this archetype, the 
integration mechanism is not heavily related to 
business units’ motivation to control the risks of 
losing the resources they already invested into 
new venture projects, nor does the archetype 
depend on administrative ownership or 
responsibility mechanisms. 
Suitable for organizations 
whose new venture units 
have limited power in 
influencing BUs’ decisions 
on accepting corporate new 
ventures.  
Suitable for organizations 
whose BUs have limited 
ability in dealing with new 
ventures that are financially 
unproven.  
 
.   
Suitable for projects that 
require an independent 
organizational 
environment to grow 
without the constraints 
of the BUs. The projects 
should be such that they 
can be folded back into 
business units after 
maturity without too 
many cultural clashes. 
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Table 4. Integration archetypes used by different organizations 
Organization Integration archetypes used 
COBI 
 
COBI’s corporate emerging business group maintains close relationships with business units through committees and other structures to inform 
business units about the projects that they are working on. In addition, COBI extensively uses Integration Archetype 2, in which the emerging 
business group initiates projects and then finds business units to co-incubate the innovation projects early on. COBI’s practices also incorporate the 
characteristics of Integration Archetype 1, which is to help business units’ innovation projects. Since business units at COBI have their own 
incubation systems, COBI’s corporate emerging business group helps business units’ projects by providing extra funding and sharing emerging 
business development expertise, etc. Our study mainly focuses on COBI’s practices in Archetype 2.  
COPH 
 
For the committee or board structure, there is a committee consisting of senior executives of business units of COPH. The committee constantly 
interacts with COPH’s Corporate Lab and the related new business unit (or “the COPH corporate unit” for short), Twice a year, this COPH 
corporate unit invites executives from business units to showcase their new venture projects.   
The COPH corporate unit extensively uses Integration Archetype 3, in which projects initiated at the COPH corporate unit are gradually transferred 
to business units as the projects becomes more mature. In order for a project to be gradually integrated into a business unit, the project needs to meet 
specific criteria and the business unit will do its own due diligence analysis to decide whether or not to accept the project. COPH also uses 
Integration Archetypes 3 and 4. In the archetype 4 situation, when a project successfully grows to adolescent phase, the project, together with other 
projects that reach similar adolescent phases, is put into an emerging business unit, rather than a mature business unit.  
COIC 
 
COIC, as a company, extensively uses board and committee structures to supervise and coordinate innovation projects in different parts of the 
company. COIC recently scaled back the board and committee structure but still considers it as an important mechanism to manage innovation. 
COIC’s corporate emerging technology group mainly uses Integration Archetype 4, where it relies on transitional organizational units to house new 
business projects that reach adolescent stages. The emerging technology group spends a long time up-front to fund and incubate innovation projects 
until the projects are mature enough. Such projects are not likely to be easily accepted by business units if they are thrown into business units as 
soon as they reach adolescence. Housing them in transitional organizational units for further growth make these projects more attractive and less 
risky for business units to eventually accept them.   
COEN  At the corporate HQ in Japan, COEN identifies people who are responsible for connecting COEN’s North American (NA) business center to 
different business units in Japan. These people acting as liaisons serve similar functions as the committee structure discussed in the article, in which 
business units are exposed to the innovation projects that COEN’s North America new venture unit is working on. The main practice that COEN 
uses is Integration Archetype 2. As indicated in the article, COEN’s NA new venture unit initiates new innovation projects, then ask business units 
to fund and co-incubate the projects.  
CONI In the early days, CONI’s corporate new business group initiated new venture projects, but did not involve business units to co-incubate these 
projects. This created many difficulties for CONI’s new business group; later, CONI’s corporate new business unit started to adopt Integration 
Archetype 1. As explained in the article, they focus on the projects that business units initiate and co-incubate the projects with the business units. 
They also require business units to increase their responsibility and support as a project grows.    
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Table 4. Integration archetypes used by different organizations (cont.) 
Organization Integration archetype used 
COME COME has several committees such as CTO Council and Technology Review committee. Presidents of business units participate in these 
committees. This committee structure allows business units to know and influence the projects that COME’s advanced technology unit (or “the 
COME corporate unit”) is working on. It also helps coordinate innovation projects between business units and the COME corporate unit to avoid 
duplications and create synergy. COME’s corporate unit also co-funds and co-incubates projects that are initiated by business units (Integration 
Archetype 1). But COME’s corporate unit more frequently uses Integration Archetype 2, in which innovation projects are either initiated at the 
corporate level (e.g., CTO office) or from corporate wide innovation competition. For these projects, the COME’s corporate unit mainly funds these 
projects and invites business units as project sponsors from early on, while business units give guidance and go or no go recommendations to these 
projects. Many times, the COME corporate unit also asks sponsoring business units to contribute engineering and other staff support. 
COEX Like other companies in our research, there is a joint committee coordinating business units and COEX’s corporate lab and its corporate new 
business development unit. The committee also decides funding and new development directions of COEX’s corporate lab and related business 
development units. COEX also uses Integration Archetype 1. Here, business units pick certain problems or directions they want to work on, and then 
business units invite COEC’s corporate lab and related new business unit to work on those new projects. In such situations, the funding mostly 
comes from business units. We also find that COEX uses Integration Archetype 2 extensively. In this practice, COEX’s corporate unit people initiate 
projects and present them to business units for funding. Sometimes COEC’s corporate unit also co-funds certain projects with business units. Once a 
project begins, COEX’s corporate unit leads the development of the projects but business units are constantly involved to monitor and influence the 
development of these projects.  
COAS 
 
COAS’ practices mainly consist of committee structure and Integration Archetype 3, in which business units gradually take over innovation projects, 
although we find that the company also uses Integration Archetype 1. For the board and committee structure, COAS establishes an approval board to 
supervise and approve new venture projects that the corporate new business group plans to incubate. Key executives of various business units sit in 
this approval board. This board structure also keeps business units well informed of the new venture projects that the corporate unit works on, thus 
avoiding the duplications where corporate and business units work on the same or similar projects. COAS also extensively uses Integration 
Archetype 3 to gradually increase business units’ commitment to the new venture projects. As explained in the article, corporate new business group 
typically incubates a new venture project for the first six months, and then the corporate group reports to the approval board for further approval, 
while at the same time, the group also requires business units to increase their commitment to support or even take over the project if the venture 
project achieves certain milestones in 12 months. Besides these mechanisms, COAS also adopts Integration Archetype 2 (involving business units 
from early on). Although COAS’ corporate new business group does not ask business units to fund and/or co-incubate innovation projects from very 
beginning, the corporate group constantly informs and communicates with business units about the progress of the projects from inceptions. 
COTS 
 
Although COTS’s corporate research center constantly communicates with various product groups, it does not have a formal committee representing 
business units to monitor innovation projects at the corporate level. This is to give the corporate research center maximum autonomy in exploring 
new directions. The corporate research center adopts Integration Archetype 2. In particular, when the corporate center starts working on an 
innovation project, it invites marketing and sales people from business units to comment and provide feedback on the projects, as these people are 
close to customers. Such early participation by the business unit gives business units a sense of ownership, which helps the project transition to these 
business units later.  
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Figure 1. Formal Integration Archetypes 
 
Integration  Archetype 1: 
Business units initiating projects, 
new venture units co-incubating  
Integration Archetype 2: 
New venture units initiating new 
projects, involving business units 
early on (early-stage) 
Integration Archetype 3: 
Gradually involving business 
units into the incubation process 
(mid-stage) 
Integration Archetype 4: 
Transitional home (late-stage) 
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